Philip Engels
In recent months, the Arab crisis has caught the attention of many nations and leaders. In the case of Turkey and Greece – the historic and geographic neighbours of the Arab world – it has become the source of much interest. In this article, I will explore the reasons for this interest as well as the future of both countries in the region.
“A foreign diplomacy based on principles” is what both Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and President Abdullah Gül have been advocating in the past years. By constantly repeating this ‘motto’ during their interviews with the global media, they have made clear to the rest of the world that Turkey wishes to play a neutral and fair role in the region by supporting both neighbouring peoples as well as their respective governments. Simply put, the aim of their foreign policy is to ensure peace and prosperity throughout the Middle East while also opening new markets for Turkish economic investments.
To achieve this goal, the Turkish government has had to play a rather double-edged role. For instance, in the case of the Mavi Marmara incident Prime Minister Erdoğan (while walking out of a conference at Davos) condemned Israel for violating international law while also insisting on a stable and fair diplomatic relationship: allowing the Israeli embassy in Ankara to resume its operations. The result of this manoeuvre: an ever more Turkish-friendly and satisfied Arab world on one side and a lasting economic partnership with Israel, on the other.
Also, during the ongoing ‘Arab awakening’ both in Egypt and in Libya, Turkey has engaged in subtle diplomatic operations ensuring both its popularity among the Arab peoples as well as among the aging dictators. In fact, a recent article published by The Economist demonstrates how Prime Minister Erdoğan was able to maintain his neutral position during the Libyan crisis: both by officially distancing himself from the West and military intervention while also declaring, a week later, a contribution of “four frigates, one submarine and an extra warship to help enforce the no-fly zone and prevent the flow of weapons to Libya” (The Economist). Again, the result of Erdoğan’s swift movements: being regarded as a neutral and yet supportive regime by the Arabs but also safeguarding a strong position within NATO as well as in European politics.
Thus, Turkey has generally managed to emerge as a fair player and even as a ‘role model’ for regional states: cooperating with potentially dangerous regimes such as Ahmadinejad/Khamenei’s Islamic republic but also with emerging democracies such as Egypt and Tunisia. Meanwhile, it has remained a key partner of the ever more anxious West.
Similarly, Greece seems to have followed the trend. Not long after his rise to power, George Papandreou had attempted to forge new economic relations with his North African counterparts in Libya and in Egypt. Also, in the recent context of the ‘Arab awakening’ the Greek government has maintained its role: this time as a key mediator between Libya and the West. Like Abdullah Gül’s Turkey it has chosen to remain as neutral as possible by avoiding direct military intervention and thus a direct association with the rather unpopular West.
Will Greece and Turkey be able to sustain their double-edged diplomacy in the Middle East while also enjoying their popularity in the Arab world? If so, will this help to solve the countless unresolved, internal issues: a risk of default in Greece and ever growing ethnic and political tensions in Turkey?
In any case, common interests in the Middle East have brought these two historic enemies much closer together.
I strongly believe that through even more cooperation: politically, economically but also socially, both can emerge stronger than ever before.
This map illustrates the strategic location of both Turkey and Greece: being situated between Europe and the Middle East
