Tony Blair’s long awaited appearance before the Iraq Inquiry last Thursday afforded little in the way of fresh justification for Britain’s troubled involvement in the Middle East. However, it did provide a fascinating portrait of a man who is acutely, if perhaps dangerously aware of his own place in history.
As Blair sat before the inquiry, backed by the families of lost troops and surrounded outside by those denouncing him as a war criminal, his nervousness was apparent. Equally apparent though, as he fidgeted intensely with his microphone, was his eagerness to begin. For Blair, this was not simply a forum to justify the decision to go to war. This was an opportunity to cement his legacy and to shape how history will view the defining matter of his premiership. As he stated at the outset of the Good Friday Agreement Talks, “I feel the hand of history on our shoulder with respect to this.” This too, was history in the making, with the unusual addition of a protagonist who knew it all too well.
From the outset, Blair has been as much concerned with the historians’ pens as with current opinion polls. Brand Blair was meticulously created in a manner which will bear as much resonance with historians in fifty years time as it did with voters in 1997. The development of New Labour possessed a great deal of the Americana iconicity of Roosevelt’s New Deal and Obama’s recent election campaign. Reflections on ‘The People’s Princess’ following the death of Diana acted as a sound bite as much tailored to the emotionally open late 1990’s electorate as Thatcher’s ‘That is out’ was to the defiant Britain of the 1980’s. The fact that Blair’s premiership directed two wars, the emergence of devolution, the introduction of both Civil Partnerships and minimum wage legislation lends credence to his place among the upper-echelons of Downing Street’s more memorable residents.
The Blair concern has never been one of short-term popularity. Even at the embryonic stages of his premiership, he was convinced of the need to be a master rather than a steward of Number 10; more like Thatcher than Major and more Churchill than Callaghan. His consummate performance within the inquiry seemed impervious to the heckles of the protesters outside. Blair has always been more concerned with historical prominence than his place among his contemporaries. It is largely this fervent desire for historical recognition as one of the great British leaders that led him down the Iraqi path. Blair’s assurance in his course of action is as unyielding today as it was in 2003. It is well noted that decisiveness and assurance are prerequisites for historical longevity and his need for historical recognition dictates such a stance.
One of the few comments to draw audible moans from the Inquiry’s public gallery was the former Prime Minister’s assertion that while he bore full responsibility for the War, he felt no regret. No-one had expected a full admission of remorse for the decision to go to war but families of troops were outraged that no regret for the loss of life had been expressed. For Blair though, such an admission was not an option. Throughout the six hours of questioning, he consistently reiterated his now trademark assertion that “hand on heart,” he did what he thought was right. An admission of regret in any form would have weakened the black and white nature of the issue in Blair’s eyes and would have been latched onto by a media that is hungry for a climb down. It is unlikely that such an admission will ever be forthcoming. History is rarely kind to leaders who admit that they were wrong.
If anything, Blair’s steadfast belief in the correctness of his own actions is admirable in isolation. However, his faith in the kindness of history has proven extremely dangerous, with repercussions far beyond the Iraqi context. Blair’s sidelining of the dissenting cabinet voices of Robin Cook and Clare Short, coupled with his manipulation of Attorney General Lord Goldsmith’s advice that regime change was illegal has only served to weaken both cabinet government and faith in the legality of government actions. This has added weight to widely held fears of an increasingly presidential and unchecked Number 10.
In addition, public resentment of the decision to go to war and the newfound distrust of American foreign policy among the British electorate has effectively tied the hands of future Prime Ministers. British governments will find it extremely difficult to join an American sponsored conflict in the Middle East for the foreseeable future, given the virtual certainty of electoral backlash. The continuing instability within the region and the possibility of a future genuine need for war has created the dual concerns of a serious continuing Middle Eastern threat and newfound British impotency.
Blair’s ultimate hope is that history will view the Iraq War as a masterstroke of foresight and that his decision will be viewed as an early, decisive action to avert a much greater threat. His assertions that the world in 2010 is much safer as a result of the decision to go to war are lent credence by the scaling back of Libya’s nuclear activity. However, as former Liberal Democrat leader Sir Menzies Campbell states, such a claim is “pure speculation.” Blair’s belief in the bigger picture of historical thinking saw him pursue a divisive war at great cost and has ensured his subsequent unwillingness to appease a public infuriated by his actions. He is willing to tolerate the barbs of the media and the screams of protestors, holding true to the Churchillian adage that “Responsibility is the price of greatness,” and reasoning is that history will judge him well.
To his opponents, this belief is a matter of speculation. To Blair, it is a matter of faith. One can only hope for his sake that, given the current devastation of his reputation, his faith will be repaid.
