The US’s recent involvement in the war in Iran has raised major concerns about Europe’s defence supply, as the Americans sink thousands of their missiles into the Middle East. According to the US Central Command, the US has struck over 5,500 Iranian targets in just the first 12 days of its operation, straining the international arms supply and leaving missile-dependent armies, like Ukraine’s, vulnerable.
Critics have warned against Europe’s overreliance on US arms for years. European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron have raised alarms about American dependency, warning in 2023 that the EU was at risk of becoming a “vassal” of the United States if it did not develop “strategic autonomy” and renew its defence industry. However, the bombardment of Iran over recent weeks, which has included the use of highly valuable interceptor missiles that are crucial to Ukraine’s defence, has raised the question: if Europe cannot rely on the United States for its defensive technology, where will these missiles come from?
The answer is not simple. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2025 report on international arms transfers, the US accounts for 48 per cent of European states’ major arms imports. These imports have more than tripled since the 2015–2019 period. Europe is particularly reliant on US companies’ advanced proprietary technologies which cannot be reproduced elsewhere.
One such proprietary technology that has proven itself indispensable to the defence of Ukraine and the wider continent against Russian and Iranian missile strikes is Lockheed Martin’s Patriot missile system and its state-of-the-art PAC-3 missiles. These missiles are undoubtedly the most important component of Ukraine’s defence against powerful Russian ballistic missiles like the Kinzhal, which habitually threaten Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
However, the pace of PAC-3 production can barely meet Ukrainian demand: it is estimated that Ukraine needs around 700 of these missiles to make it through challenging periods like winter and Lockheed Martin only produced roughly 600 of them in 2025. This scarcity will only be exacerbated by the conflict with Iran as the US will likely prioritise supporting its Gulf allies and its own forces over Europe.
Some experts, such as Volodymyr Fesenko, head of the Kyiv-based think tank Penta, believe that Russia already has plans to exploit this missile shortage. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Fesenko suggested that the recent pause in Russian drone strikes in March indicates that Moscow is amassing arms and that its “most obvious action would be to bleed Ukraine’s stock of Patriot missiles dry” through a successive bombardment.
Where Europe will source its defensive missiles is unclear. Modern global networks create an interdependency that can be weaponised in times of rising conflict like now. Europe’s response should be clear. The four-year war in Ukraine, which claims thousands of lives every month, the uncertainty around US security guarantees and the threats made by US President Donald Trump about annexing Greenland all point to a dire need for a natively produced and technologically advanced European arms industry.
Europe is already taking significant steps in this direction. On 6 March 2026, EU Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius began his “missile tour” across the continent with the goal of raising Europe’s production capacity for defence and its air defence supply for Ukraine. Kubilius started in Warsaw, where he met with Polish defence minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz at a PGZ factory, one of Europe’s largest defence contractors. Poland is one of Europe’s largest arms producers and PGZ manufactures many defensive missile systems for Ukraine.
However, the strategic groundwork for a greater domestic defence industry in Europe has been laid out for some time. In March 2024, the European Commission proposed its European Defence Investment Strategy (EDIS). EDIS is a strategic framework designed to boost Europe’s defence industry. It specifically aims to increase defence spending inside Europe so that at least 50 per cent of EU member states’ defence procurement budget is devoted to procurement within the EU by 2030.
That said, the EDIS is just a policy framework that has to be enforced through legislative implementation. The first major breakthrough in this legal implementation came only in December 2025 when the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) was approved by the European Parliament and Council. The EDIP is an EU regulation that pledges to provide €1.5 billion in financial support from the EU budget to defence measures.
The EDIP explicitly focuses on “industrial reinforcement actions” which are designed to limit American dependency and create a more self-sufficient European defence industry. The programme specifies that defensive measures will only be eligible for funding if at least 65 per cent of their costs are for components that originate within the EU or an associated country. This not only boosts the EU economy but also ensures that in the case of unforeseen global conflict, the supply chain for these arms and defence measures will not be disrupted as is the case now.
Another EU programme designed to increase defence spending in Europe is the SAFE mechanism, which was established in June 2025. This funding mechanism provides up to €150 billion in loans to member states for defence spending. Poland in particular stood to benefit from this SAFE mechanism, having secured a massive €43.7 billion loan from the EU intended for defence production.
However, on 12 March 2026, Polish president Karol Nawrocki vetoed the loans entirely, claiming he did not want to commit the country to “massive foreign loans”. This represented another blow to European security and will only further slow down Europe’s defence production.
Evidently, the path toward European security and self-reliance is shaky. Although programmes like SAFE and EDIP represent positive steps in the right direction, the bureaucratic labyrinth that these measures have had to navigate in order to be approved has slowed down their enforcement dramatically. The EDIP for example, had to go through 21 months of legislative procedure before approval. These procedures are, of course, in place to ensure legal rigour, but this extensive process is what has left Ukraine so vulnerable.
It remains unclear how much Ukraine stands to benefit from these defence programmes currently. The situation in the Middle East has put an unexpected strain on the nation’s defence supply and a faster legislative response from the EU could have prevented this. As it stands, Ukraine has just received a lifeline in the form of roughly 35 Patriot missiles from Germany’s stockpile, according to a Der Spiegel report. However, these stockpiles cannot last forever.
The persisting Russian invasion, as well as Iranian missiles encroaching on European airspace, should make it all the more evident that Europe is in desperate need of an autonomous defence industry. Otherwise, the American networks of arms transfers on which the continent is so reliant may become weapons in and of themselves.
