In the face of rising geopolitical security threats, the European Union (EU) pledged in March 2025 to mobilise €800 billion for defence investment, laying the groundwork for increasing militarisation across the union. While Europe has been increasing its defence investment over the past few years, with spending growing by more than 31 per cent between 2021 and 2025, this step, and the rhetoric that accompanies it, marks a decisive shift away from the commitment to international cooperation upon which the EU was built. While increasing militarisation has understandably evoked concerns across Europe, including within Ireland, it must be understood as an unavoidable response to a rapidly deteriorating security environment.
For much of the post-Cold War period, the EU solidified itself as a bastion of liberal institutionalism on the global stage, and as a counterweight to the realpolitik that dominated the twentieth century. Its model was simple: accession to the union was contingent upon democracy, adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, this era of peace has come to an end, and the EU is being drawn increasingly into renewed instability within the realm of international security. Market power is no longer enough to guarantee European security, and the EU has begun to favour an ideological shift towards hard power as a result.
The EU has committed itself to a surge in defence spending and increased militarisation across the board. The European Commission published its White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 in March 2025, arguing that Europe must increase defence investment to compete with the levels of the US, China, and Russia, through its “ReArm Europe Plan”. The plan itself involves mobilising €800 billion to boost defence funding and provide financial levers to EU member states in order to close capability gaps and achieve full “readiness” by 2030. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a €150 billion loan instrument, was adopted by the Council of the EU in May 2025 to help countries increase expenditure on common defence procurement. President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, welcomed the implementation of SAFE as a “critical step forward”.
Russia’s continued war on Ukraine, the genocide in Palestine, US volatility and, most recently, the US attack on Venezuela and capture of its President Nicolás Maduro — these events, among others, highlight the growing instability of our current geopolitical system. In light of these issues, and compounded by the fragmentation and underinvestment of Europe’s defence industry, the EU’s “Re-arm Europe Plan” must be viewed as an unfortunate yet pragmatic necessity, one which serves to protect the security of its 27 member states in increasingly volatile times.
Most crucially, an increase in defence spending within the EU can be viewed as an effort to repair relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which have grown progressively more fragmented as European countries have struggled to match the defence spending of their fellow members. While the EU’s White Paper describes its partnership with NATO as the “cornerstone of collective defence of its members in Europe”, European countries have repeatedly failed to meet NATO defence spending targets. This has increasingly strained transatlantic relationships, with US President Trump threatening to withdraw US security guarantees as a result. This potentiality, though unlikely, would be disastrous for Europe, given that US commitment to NATO’s principle of collective defense is a crucial aspect of European deterrence against further Russian aggression. At the 2025 NATO summit in the Hague, members committed to spending five per cent of GDP annually on core defence requirements and defence-and-security related spending by 2035. This is a significant jump from NATO’s previous two per cent commitment, and EU efforts to meet this target reflect an attempt to reassure allies and preserve credibility.
While improving EU–NATO relations is paramount from the perspective of deterring Putin, it is also crucial that the EU reduces reliance on the US, particularly in light of Trump’s repeated threats to take Greenland. Trump’s administration has made it clear that they plan to acquire Greenland either through negotiation, purchase, or a military takeover. Denmark has in turn made clear that any US military action against Greenland would jeopardize the NATO alliance and the transatlantic security links. These threats highlight the need for the EU to create an autonomous defence base, and reduce overreliance on the US. The EU is reliant on the US in terms of both security guarantees and foreign imports. Between 2020 and 2024, 64 per cent of the defence procurement of European NATO countries came from the US. Reducing reliance on foreign imports requires a stronger defence industrial base within the EU. Kaja Kallas, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has called for the creation of an EU single market for defence aimed at enhancing interoperability and combatting structural barriers to collective security.
However, the situation becomes more complex with regards to traditionally militarily neutral countries such as Ireland. In December 2025, Minister for Foreign Affairs Helen McEntee announced spending plans of €1.7 billion on defence. This amounts to a 55 per cent increase in defence overall, and aims to modernise the Defence Forces system-wide, on land, in the air, at sea and in the cyber domain. This increase in spending reflects the Government’s concern about modernising the Defense Forces in time for Ireland’s Presidency of the Council of the EU this summer. This attitude is also reflected in the Government’s proposition to amend the Triple Lock legislation, which has historically been viewed as the bulwark of Irish neutrality. This has naturally aroused concerns among politicians over the security of Ireland’s longstanding policy of military neutrality.
There are a number of voices who view the push towards increased militarisation as a dangerous one. People Before Profit TD Richard Boyd Barrett has equated increased militarism in Ireland with a threat to Ireland’s long history of neutrality. During her election campaign, President Catherine Connolly warned that the increased militarisation across the EU had “some parallels with the ‘30s”, and that “Germany is revitalising its economy through the military industrial complex”. However, despite being militarily neutral, Ireland is not immune to external hybrid threats. The HSE was the target of a cyber-attack in 2021, and reports of unidentified drones only 17km from the Dublin coast accompanied the visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in December 2025. Ireland suffers from huge defensive capability gaps, and it is likely that external threats will only increase with our EU Presidency. Ireland must find a way to reconcile its policy of military neutrality with an increasingly militarising EU and growing national security threats.
While concerns around increased European militarisation are valid, it is time to accept that Europe has been drawn into a new security dilemma, and must increase its defence capabilities as a result. How Europe chooses to use its military base will serve as a real test of its democratic institutions and commitment to international law. If Europe is to deter further Russian aggression, protect its borders from growing threats, and compete internationally in terms of defence, increased militarisation is a necessary evil.
