On September 9th, at least nineteen Russian drones entered Polish airspace without prior warning. At least three had been shot down, but a number escaped, even after crossing (in one case) more than 700 km into the country’s territory. Russia claimed the incident to be accidental and a result of error, but a few days later, on the 14th, there was another incursion, this time in Romania. And then another one, with planes, in Estonia. As of the time of writing, another incident is unfolding, with drones attributed to professional actors disrupting operations in multiple Danish airports.
So far, no drones are reported to have been armed, either in the Danish case or in the previous Polish and Romanian incursions. The situation is less clear regarding the fighter jets in Estonia. Even without the presence of missiles, however, this collected action is a clear mark of escalation on the part of Russia. Three years into the invasion of Ukraine, it is a possible signal that Putin and his generals might be considering an expansion of the front into other countries.
If that is the case, the obvious question arises. Why the coyness? During the invasion of Ukraine, there was a swift development with tanks present on the border on February 23rd 2022, and active military engagement starting on the 24th. Here, instead of an attempted rapid assault, we have testing of boundaries and denials of action. What could be the reason?
First, the Ukrainian war itself and the expenses it has caused Russia to accrue. The US Department of Defence estimates more than 600,000 Russian soldiers to have been killed or injured since the start of the conflict, with another estimate from Republic.Ru going as high as 1,200,000. Hundreds of billions of dollars had also been lost as a result of sanctions and bank assets being frozen. Additionally, some sources estimate that 1/6th of the country’s gasoline and diesel fuel production has been rendered inoperable as a result of Ukrainian strikes on facilities.
An expansion of the front would mean further extending the already thinning economic and personnel resources, spreading them thin atop a broader field and prolonging the already vulnerable supply line. While many in the Kremlin are presumably in favour of this, it would still be a huge commitment, the sustainability of which would remain dubious.
Second, and even more importantly, Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Denmark are EU members and NATO allies. The latter fact is particularly crucial as, under Article 5, they are entitled to military aid from all fellow allies in the event of an armed attack by a foreign power. On September 10th, immediately after the first incursion, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk triggered Article 4, which calls for a discussion between the NATO allies and is often seen as a needed precursor to Article 5.
In an address to the Sejm in Warsaw, Tusk said:
‘Article 4 is only the beginning of the deepened cooperation for the sake of the safety of our skies and our borders, which are NATO borders.’ Tusk also promised to shoot down any further Russian aircraft to violate Polish airspace.
Despite Russia’s denials of ill will, NATO has taken the threat seriously and has, on the 12th, announced the start of a new Operation Eastern Sentry, the goal of which would be to strengthen the air, sea and land presence of the NATO forces along the alliance’s eastern border.
Even Donald Trump offered a number of peremptory condemnations, ranging from the enigmatic ‘What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!’ posted on X to finally changing his mind and stating that ‘Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form’ during this year’s U.N. summit.
Will this be enough? As a Pole whose friends and family live in Warsaw, I am not above saying I am absolutely terrified it will not. Ever since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a fear of subsequent attacks has been constant in countries along the border, causing many, including myself, to rethink the level of military spending needed in order to sustain a sense of safety when faced with the threat of Kremlin forces. At the moment, according to the 2024 SIPRI database, Poland, at 4.15%, has the highest percentage of GDP dedicated to military spending in the EU, with Estonia following second at 3.37%. Denmark is at 2.4%, Romania at 2.24% while, for context, Russia is at 7.05% and the U.S. at 3.42%. Ireland, remaining neutral and not a NATO member, places somewhere between 0.2% and 0.25%.
These percentages do not strictly reflect actual military potential. The American military industrial complex is famously giant, even though its relative spending to GDP is lower than Estonia’s. Russia, as one of the world’s most powerful countries, which chooses to designate more than 7% percent of its wealth into its army, has a military presence that no one country in Europe can withstand on its own. Putin knows it, which is why it is so crucial that his current attempts at testing the waters make it clear that no country will be left to stand alone.
There is a real chance that, in between the writing and publication of this article, another airspace incursion will have occurred. Hopefully, it will also not involve missiles. However, this cannot be guaranteed. An escalation of the war in Europe would be catastrophic, but precisely because of that, it is crucial that NATO and EU stay united.
