The job of Prime Minister in France has never been a stable one; since 1958, the position has been held by 28 people. Yet, since his re-election in 2022, President Emmanuel Macron has struggled more than most to keep someone in office, churning through five different Prime Ministers. What is going on in France right now, and why is government stability a seemingly impossible feat?
Sebastien Lecornu was the latest Prime Minister (PM) to resign, having resigned in early October 2025 after 27 days in office. Only four days later, Lecornu returned to office after accepting Macron’s reappointment request. Examining Lecornu’s actions leading up to his resignation, it’s easy to understand why he left. After announcing the names of his newly convened ministerial cabinet, opposition parties were quick to criticise Lecornu for his decisions. In particular, his decision to bring back former finance minister Bruno Le Maire as Defence Minister sparked waves of attack against the PM. Critics of Le Maire argued that the budgetary deficit that occurred under Le Maire’s term as Finance minister was exemplary of Macronian economic policy that no longer worked.The right-wing Les Ŕepublicains (LR) party took umbrage with Lecornu’s appointment of Le Maire. LR leader, Bruno Retailleau publicly criticised Lecornu, and claimed that despite the two having met the day before ministerial appointments were released, Lecornu had blindsided the LR with the news of Le Maire’s position. In a bid to try and diffuse the situation, Le Maire immediately resigned from his position before attending the first ministerial meeting, but this was clearly not enough to appease the crisis. Feeling the withdrawal of support from the LR, Lecornu took swift action. In an attempt to avoid the attacks directed at him, Lecornu then handed in his resignation mere hours after his ministerial appointments. Fast forward four days, and at Macron’s request, Lecornu was back in office.
Although the reinstatement of this nature may seem bizarre, Macron had to work under a time crunch, owing to the looming deadline for the PM to put the budget for 2026 before parliament. Public debate and discourse around French finances have heightened Macron’s desire to quickly stabilise the situation. France’s public debt in early 2025 was almost 114 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), making it the third highest in the Eurozone, and subsequently generating vast political divisions over how best to limit the budget deficit.
In part, the record-high figure of French debt to GDP can explain the revolving door of prime ministers under Macron. Previous PM Francois Bayrou failed to get backing for his budget cut of €44 billion, and as such was forced out of office by opponents. While opposition parties agree that France’s debt is vastly too high, they disagree on which parts of the government should face budget cuts to reduce it. With this in mind, the rapid turnaround of Lecornu’s exit and reinstatement seems considerably less surprising.
Aside from this, it’s worth looking at the composition of Macron’s government to understand why it lacks desperately needed stability. After his re-election in 2022, Macron began his second term on a bad foot. Following the election, parliamentary elections were due to take place. New presidents are normally able to bring their influence and momentum into parliament to gain a majority from their party. In Macron’s case, this did not work. Unlike his first term election, Macron’s success in the polls the second time around can be attributed to keeping far-right leader Marine Le Pen out, rather than eagerness to vote Macron in. Lack of real enthusiasm for Macronian politics was then subsequently reflected by the parliamentary election. The president’s governing coalition fell short of a majority by 40 seats, and therefore left Macron with unsteady footing and a tenuous ability to pass measures like the annual budget.
Coalition governments are not necessarily doomed to fail; just think of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition in Germany between 2005 and 2021. Yet, there are two key reasons why in France’s case, a coalition has meant disaster for Macron’s government.
First, Macron made his situation worse. In July 2024, EU elections for European Parliament occurred, and in France, the far-right party Rassemblement National won with 31 per cent of the vote, as Macron’s own party narrowly fought for second place with a lowly 14 per cent. That night, Macron shocked the nation by announcing the dissolution of parliament with absolutely no obligation to have done so. With three years left of its term to run, the dissolution was a curveball, and a risk that did not pay off. While hoping that the rise of the far-right would shock the French into voting for moderation and securing seats for his own party, his gamble had the opposite effect, and an even more fragmented parliament was voted in. Although left-wing parties quickly scrambled to form the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) alliance, they only narrowly gained a majority, and thus an even more fragmented parliament was formed.
Second, the concept of coalition government in France is not a normal one. Since there is no tradition, historic or otherwise, of forming coalitions with one’s political opponents in France, any coalitions that are formed seem to be doomed to fail. The divisive nature of French politics means left and wing parties are generally rather disdainful of each other, and even politically like-minded parties regularly fall out. The Nouveau Front Populaire alliance that secured some semblance of stability in the 2024 election has since broken apart, clearly demonstrating the lack of stable leadership within French coalitions.
Consequently, prime ministers are faced with a mammoth task of unifying parties within the coalition, and attempting to deliver a majority made of warring factions. Lecornu has since survived a second no-confidence vote raised against him by the far-right, offering a glimmer of hope amidst absolute chaos. Yet, the prime minister still has to survive weeks of extremely tense negotiations over the budget, during which he could be ousted at any point. The tenuous nature of his position is evident in Lecornu’s negotiations with the socialist members of coalition, having just axed the divisive pension reform until 2027, in order to sway the Socialists in his favour. By abandoning such a key Macronian policy within the budget, it is clear that Lecornu is aware of the precarious nature of his position, and is now desperately clinging to support until this crisis subsides.
Until then, Macron can only hope Lecornu can gain enough support to pass the budget, and reign in government spending without further dividing an already polarised parliament. Having reportedly given Lecornu a carte blanche to get the budget through, Macron is increasingly desperate to regain some semblance of stability, but faced with opposition from the left, and increasing popular support for Le Pen’s far-right, it is clear that France’s political storm shows no signs of abating.
