Brussels’ decision in progressing the release of €4.2 billion in frozen cohesion funds and restoring full Hungarian access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe is one of the clearest signs that Hungary’s relationship with the EU has changed since the fall of Viktor Orbán’s government. During Orbán’s 16 years in power, the EU increasingly argued that weaknesses in public procurement, anti-corruption enforcement and prosecutorial independence, among other autocratic and authoritarian issues, put European money at risk. These funds had been frozen since 2022, when the EU used its conditionality mechanism to suspend billions of euros in funding in response to previously mentioned concerns. Restrictions also affected universities governed by public-interest trusts that Brussels feared were too closely connected to Orbán’s political power. That decision cut many Hungarian institutions off from new Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe commitments, adversely affecting many students and stifling their opportunities. What has changed since Magyar took office is, therefore, more concrete than a change in tone. According to the European Commission, Hungary has taken corrective steps in public procurement, the anti-corruption framework, and the effectiveness of prosecutorial action. On that basis and easing the previous concerns and grievances, the Commission proposed lifting the measures tied to €4.2 billion in cohesion funding and restoring access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe. Yet Brussels has also stressed that this does not close every rule-of-law file from the Orbán era, as about €3.5 billion remains blocked under a separate procedure, including money linked to concerns involving academic freedom, LGBTQ+ rights, and asylum policy.
This distinction is important because it detracts from any claim that Magyar alone “won back” Hungary’s EU money. His government deserves substantial credit for acting quickly on demands that the Orbán administration had resisted, disputed, or only dismissed in their totality. Magyar also entered office with an unusually strong political mandate. His Tisza party won a landslide in the April election, ending Orbán’s 16-year rule and securing more than the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to unwind parts of the constitutional and institutional system built under Fidesz. Reuters reported that the election gave Magyar a clear opening to pursue anti-corruption measures and reforms that EU critics had long demanded. Still, the reforms would be difficult to explain without the pressure that preceded Magyar. The EU’s funding freeze created the incentives that made rule-of-law reform financially urgent and socially needed. Billions of euros were placed behind conditions, and access to European education and research programmes became part of the cost of noncompliance. Solely, that pressure did not force Orbán to transform his system, but it changed the political environment in which his successor took office. Magyar inherited both the problem and a readily made set of benchmarks for solving it.
A most reasonable conclusion, then, is that the breakthrough belongs to both political turnover inside Hungary and sustained leverage from Brussels. EU conditionality created a price and precedent for institutional backsliding, and voters created the opportunity for a party willing to pay attention to that price. Magyar accelerated the process, but he did not create the conditions that made reform valuable. Without years of EU scrutiny and frozen funds, his promise to “bring the money home” would have carried far less political weight and arguably made the task of changing Hungary’s political landscape far lengthier and complex.
For Hungarian students, the reopening of Erasmus+ may be the most immediate and personal result. Erasmus is not simply a subsidy for travel, dismissively it might be, but we take for granted the ability it gives students access to semesters abroad, language learning, professional networks, and academic experiences that can shape careers. The suspension not only created uncertainty for students at affected universities, but it also forced Hungary to rely on domestic alternatives and temporary workarounds. Even where individual students found other routes abroad, the damage was done since applicants could not assume that the same European opportunities available to peers elsewhere in the EU would remain available to them.
For researchers, renewed access to Horizon Europe may matter even more structurally. Most modern academic research depends on international collaboration, long-term grant planning and shared laboratory usage, amongst other necessities. Exclusion can make an institution a less attractive partner before a project even begins. Years of restricted access therefore risked doing more than withholding grant money. They could weaken professional networks and push talented researchers toward institutions elsewhere in Europe, exacerbating the Hungarian brain drain already present before Orbán’s government took power. Reopening the programme cannot instantly reverse that effect, but it restores a route back into Europe’s research system at the very least, which allows universities and other institutions to keep talent domestic and internationally competitive.
There is also a warning in the current deal presented to Magyar. The Commission’s proposal still requires approval in the Council, and the remaining frozen funds show that the EU does not view Hungary’s rule-of-law disputes as fully settled. The next step will be whether reforms survive beyond the immediate need to unlock money. Changing laws is faster than changing institutions, administrative habits, or political culture. For that reason, the €4.2 billion thaw should be seen neither as a gift from Brussels nor as proof that Hungary’s autocratic problems have disappeared. It is better understood as evidence that conditionality can produce results when domestic politics make reform possible and realistic. Magyar’s victory supplied the political opening; after years of EU pressure, it supplied the leverage that slowly ate away at Orbán supporters. Students and researchers, meanwhile, are finally beginning to recover opportunities that became collateral damage in a much larger struggle over the rule of law.