Ireland has a long tradition of military neutrality which has shaped its foreign policy and defence posture for a century. More recently however, underinvestment into the Defence Forces has come into question; neutrality cannot be vulnerability by design, and commentators have increasingly called for greater defence spending. A neutral state must still possess the credible ability to defend its sovereignty, protect its infrastructure, and ensure the safety of its citizens and diplomatic guests. On this test, Ireland’s present defence reality is difficult to defend.
Relative to national wealth, Ireland consistently spends the least among EU states, with outlays hovering around 0.2 per cent to 0.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) — roughly €1.3 to €1.5 billion annually in recent budgets. By comparison the EU average exceeds 1 per cent while many states now aim for 2 per cent or higher amid deteriorating global security conditions. Even when using Ireland’s modified national income figures, spending still barely approaches 0.4 per cent, leaving it firmly at the bottom of the European table.
Government policy has shifted in recent years, as Budget 2026 allocated a record €1.5 billion to defence, representing an 11 per cent annual increase and a roughly 35 per cent rise since 2022. Plans exist to bring funding closer to €1.7 billion by the end of the decade and to modernise key capabilities such as radar and personnel support. These increases still must be understood in the context of a low baseline — incremental rises still leave Ireland far behind comparable European peers. In real terms, recent policy shifts are slow corrections.
Personnel numbers are similarly sobering: Ireland’s Defence Forces currently field roughly 7,500 active personnel, well below the already modest establishment strength of 10,000. Recruitment and retention are chronic problems for the Defence Forces, driven by pay concerns, housing pressures and limited career progression. Internal reviews have highlighted dissatisfaction among serving members and anecdotal accounts from within the forces describe a service struggling to maintain morale.
Material capability gaps are significant contributors to the problem. Historically Ireland has relied on partners, and particularly the United Kingdom (UK), for certain critical defence functions. Famously, Ireland relies on the UK’s Royal Air Force in the event of need for rapid response airspace policing — the absence of fighter aircraft, limited naval capacity, and incomplete radar coverage have long been noted vulnerabilities. Recent reports suggest that preparations for hosting high-level EU meetings have required accelerated investment in drone defence and radar systems, underscoring the uncomfortable reality that Ireland has struggled to independently secure even temporary concentrations of European leadership. Such episodes reveal a structural issue: Ireland’s defence apparatus is still calibrated for a less demanding geopolitical era.
Comparisons with other neutral states reinforce the scale of the gap. Switzerland, perhaps Europe’s most iconic neutral country, spends roughly 0.7 to 1 per cent of GDP on defence and maintains robust territorial defence capabilities, including conscription. Austria, another militarily nonaligned state, has committed to increasing defence spending toward 2 per cent of GDP over the coming decade.
Increasingly, analysts warn that Ireland’s vast maritime domain — including undersea data cables vital to global communications — presents strategic vulnerabilities. The mismatch between economic importance and defence investment has become harder to ignore as European security deteriorates.
In this context, calls to join military alliances such as NATO often arise in response to Ireland’s defence weaknesses. However, neutrality remains a deeply rooted element of Irish political identity and public opinion. Moreover, alliance membership should not be treated as a substitute for national responsibility. A state that neglects its own capabilities while relying on alliances risks eroding both sovereignty and credibility.
Ultimately, the question is not whether Ireland should become a military power, and rather it is whether a wealthy, strategically located neutral state can justify remaining the weakest defence investor in Europe. Increasing defence spending toward even 1 per cent of GDP would represent a profound shift, enabling improvements in pay, recruitment, maritime security, and air surveillance. Such an approach would not militarise Irish society but would instead normalise its defence posture relative to comparable states.
